European Disaster Assessment 2024: Impacts, Accrued Vulnerabilities and Evaluation of European Adaptive Capacities

I. The Year 2024: An Intensification of Extreme Weather Phenomena

The year 2024 marked a milestone in the acceleration of the effects of climate change in Europe. Analyses by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) confirm a trend towards an intensification of extreme phenomena, marked by striking geographical contrasts and widespread flooding^.1 This context is set against a backdrop of one of the hottest years on record in Europe, increasing the pressure on national and European adaptation and prevention systems.

I.A. The predominance of hydro-meteorological disasters and secondary risks

On a global scale, economic losses due to natural disasters in 2024 amounted to around $241.95 billion, over 90% of which were directly attributable to weather-related events^.3 This data underlines the transformation of the risk landscape.

The main drivers of this increase in losses are no longer just the classic peak risks (such as earthquakes or hurricanes), but increasingly “secondary perils“, including severe thunderstorms, hail, watershed flooding and forest fires^.4 These events, often smaller in scale but multiplying in frequency, are constantly eroding assets and complicating insurance and prevention efforts. Global insurers such as Swiss Re are anticipating a 5-7% annual increase in insured losses, a clear warning of the non-linearity and exponential growth of climate-related impacts on the economy^.5

What’s more, in 2024 Europe experienced a marked climatic contrast between East and West. This imbalance had direct repercussions, not least on renewable energy production. The potential for electricity production from photovoltaic solar energy, for example, clearly reflected the dichotomy between sunnier regions in the East and cloudier ones in the West^.2 This heterogeneity of climatic impacts across the continent calls for regionalized, rather than monolithic, adaptation strategies.

I.B. Chronology of the Major Events of 2024: A Critical Geographical Distribution

The year 2024 has been structured around two major threats: rapid and widespread flooding, and prolonged heat waves, mainly in the Mediterranean.

The Central European floods of September 2024 were the most destructive hydrometeorological event of the year. They hit the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia simultaneously^.6 The initial human toll exceeded 27 deaths, with 9 people reported missing^.6 These events necessitated the declaration of a state of emergency in some areas, such as Bratislava^.7

Other localized but serious floods occurred, notably in southernGermany (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria) in May 2024 ⁸ and in

Italy (Aosta Valley) in June 2024^.8 These disasters were significant enough to trigger a request for activation of the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), confirming their qualification as a “major natural disaster”^.8

At the same time, the summer was marked by extreme heat waves in southern Europe. These heatwaves led to significant excess mortality in Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain^.3

Finally, the example of Mayotte, a French department and outermost region of the EU, illustrates a critical point: a tropical cyclone hit a population already facing structural precariousness. The consequences of this disaster were exacerbated by inadequate infrastructures and limited local policies, revealing the limits of European solidarity in the face of unequal resources within the Union itself^.10

I.C. Global data summary and European context

Although natural hazards dominated the disaster news in Europe in 2024, the state of technological hazards is also worth noting. The 2024 inventory for France by the Bureau d’analyse des risques et pollutions industriels (Barpi) indicates, for the first time since 2015, that no major industrial accidents were recorded^.11 However, accidentology at non-seveso-classified Installations Classées pour la Protection de l’Environnement (ICPE) increased, particularly in the agri-food industry, the most accident-prone sector in 2024^.11 This observation is a reminder that, despite the preponderance of climatic threats, industrial vigilance remains essential.

II. Overview of disasters in 2024: Characteristics and scale of intervention

Assessment of the year 2024 requires precise quantification of major events. The following table provides a factual overview of the main disasters and initial impact assessments, serving as a basis for analysis of the institutional response.

Table 1: Factual assessment of major disasters in Europe (2024)

Disaster	Affected country(ies)/region(s)	Dominant peril type	Initial Human Assessment (Deaths/Disappearances)	Estimated economic damage (Initial)	Notable European response
Floods in Central Europe (Sept.)	Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova	Flooding (torrential rains)	27+ deaths, 9 missing ⁶	Approx. 4.2 billion euros (Total) ⁶	UCPM mobilization; FSUE assistance for subsequent damage (to come)
Summer heat waves (Summer)	Italy, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria (mainly South)	Extreme temperature (heatwave)	35,000 to 85,000 deaths (most likely estimate) ¹²	Major indirect losses (health, productivity) ³	Action de Santé Publique ; Surmortalité signalée ³
Flooding in southern Germany (May)	Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria (DE)	Flooding / Heavy rain	N.C. direct for this period	2.6 billion euros (insured flood/rain damage) ¹³	Proposed mobilization of the FSUE (share of 116 M€) ⁸
Aosta Valley floods (June)	Italy (Aosta Valley)	Flooding	N.C. direct for this period	Inclusion in EUSF ⁸ application	Proposed mobilization of the FSUE (share of 116 M€) ⁸
Cyclone (Mayotte)	Mayotte (FR, RUP)	Tropical Cyclone	Severe disturbances	Structural losses amplified by job insecurity ¹⁰	Solidarity deficit noted ¹⁰

II.A. Floods Exceeding the Major Catastrophe Threshold

The floods that hit Europe in September 2024 caused damage estimated at 4.2 billion euros, of which only 1.9 billion euros were insured, revealing a significant gap between the total cost and market coverage. ⁶ Beyond the human toll (27 deaths), the impact on infrastructure was severe, with the cancellation of international rail services (e.g. Budapest-Vienna) and the destruction of engineering structures, such as the iron bridge at Kłodzko in Poland. ⁶ The impact even extended to the continuity of civil functions, forcing the Czech Republic to organize voting for senatorial elections in temporary structures (tents, containers) in five severely affected cities.⁶

The “major” nature of several 2024 events justified European intervention. In October 2024, a proposal for a Parliament and Council Decision was issued to mobilize the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) to the tune of EUR 116,031,553 in favor of Germany and Italy, in response to the floods of May and June^.8

II.B. The Forgotten Health Crisis: Heatwaves and Excessive Mortality

Summer heat waves are the most lethal threat to European populations, although they are often less visible than the physical destruction caused by flooding. The most likely estimate of heat-related excess mortality in Europe for the summer of 2024 is in the alarming range of 35,000 to 85,000 deaths^.12

Mediterranean countries, including Italy and Spain, were the most affected. Italy leads the way, with an estimated 13,858 to 23,506 heat-related deaths. Spain follows with an estimated 4,655 to 8,513 deaths. In addition, mortality relative to the population has been particularly heavy in Greece and Bulgaria^.12 In Germany, the toll is estimated at around 2,800 heat-related deaths in 2024^.13

Analysis of these figures reveals a structural disparity in the perception of and response to disasters. Floods, as sudden-onset shock events, generate a high level of immediate mobilization (UCPM, EUSF) and a clear count of insured physical damage^.6 By contrast, heatwaves, as chronic health crises, cause an “invisible mortality” estimated to be ten to twenty times higher than the direct toll of floods. EU funding and response are thus structurally better adapted to shock disasters than to chronic health risks, leading to a persistent underestimation of heat as a “major disaster” requiring an equivalent mobilization of resources.

II.C. Other disruptive events

The example of Mayotte, hit by a cyclone, shows that vulnerability to disasters is not only linked to the intensity of the phenomenon, but is strongly exacerbated by pre-existing socio-economic conditions. Structural precariousness and the inadequacy of local infrastructures transformed a severe climatic event into an amplified social catastrophe^.10

Finally, risk analysis in Europe must take into account the many medium-sized events. The fact that insured losses are increasingly dominated by “secondary risks” (such as hailstorms or localized flooding), rather than by mega-disasters, means that Europe is experiencing a steady erosion of its assets and infrastructure^.4 This multiplication of medium-intensity events makes prevention efforts more complex and costly, as they cannot focus solely on areas at risk of extreme events, but must cover the entire territory.

III. Multidimensional Population Impact Analysis

The disasters of 2024 had profound and intertwined consequences, affecting not only human life and the economy, but also the psychosocial well-being of populations.

III.A. Direct Human Cost: Deaths, Injuries and Forced Displacement

The impact of flooding results in massive disruption to daily life. EUSF funds are explicitly used to cover the costs of temporary accommodation, rescue services and the restoration of essential infrastructure (energy, telecommunications, transport)^.8

Forced displacement, while dominated globally by conflict (with UNHCR reporting over 123 million forcibly displaced people globally in 2024) ¹⁵, is a critical issue in Europe during climatic events. By way of comparison, the floods in Emilia-Romagna in 2023 displaced around 36,600 people^.16 The events of 2024, particularly in Central Europe, also necessitated the displacement of thousands of people, illustrating that climate-related internal displacement remains a major challenge for emergency management on the continent.

Table 2: Quantification of Human Impact: Heat vs. Flood (Europe 2024)

Impact Indicator	Flooding (e.g. Central Europe, Germany)	Heat waves (Southern Europe)	Analytical conclusion
Direct Mortality (Estimated 2024)	Approximately 30 to 40 deaths (initial/direct figures) ⁶	35,000 to 85,000 deaths (most likely estimate) ¹²	Heat is the leading cause of climate-related mortality in 2024.
Material losses insured	Very high (e.g. €1.9 billion for CE Floods, €2.6 billion for DE Floods) ⁶	Little or none (mostly healthcare costs)	The human impact (death) is inversely correlated with the physical destruction insured.
Priority Institutional Response	Protection Civile (UCPM/FSUE) ⁸	Public health systems (RKI, regional authorities) ³	Weak integration of chronic health risks into the EU’s emergency policies (EUSF/UCPM)^.19

III.B. Effects on livelihoods and economic sectors

Climate-related disasters in 2024 severely disrupted livelihoods, housing and economic sectors, particularly agriculture, as highlighted by the European Parliament^.20

The agri-food sector is particularly vulnerable. Persistent droughts in southern Europe, coupled with violent floods (such as those in northern Italy), have increased credit risk in the industry and threatened food security^.21 Water shortages are putting considerable pressure on the macroeconomic performance of regions heavily dependent on agriculture^.22 The sector’s resilience is now heavily dependent on government support to avoid a wave of bankruptcies^.21

What’s more, the impact on essential infrastructure (transport, energy, water) is systemic. Restoring these services is a major component of post-disaster funding by the EUSF^.14 The floods in Germany, for example, not only caused insured damage of 2.6 billion euros, but also required complex fiscal measures to support disaster victims and businesses, demonstrating the fiscal and administrative repercussions of a major disaster^.13

The case of Mayotte highlights the importance of the vulnerability multiplier. The cyclone disaster there revealed that a population already affected by structural precariousness and inadequate infrastructures sees the consequences of a climatic event exacerbated disproportionately^.10 This shows that climate adaptation in Europe must be inseparable from policies for social cohesion and the reduction of inequalities.

III.C. Psychosocial Impact: A Growing Public Health Burden

The impact of disasters on the mental health and psychosocial well-being of populations is an invisible and growing cost. These events generate a wide range of consequences, from post-traumatic stress disorder to anxiety and community burnout^.24

The experience of recent floods highlights the imperative of integrating psychological support into emergency plans. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, following the floods of 2024 (more than 20 victims), the World Health Organization (WHO) highlighted the urgent need to address the mental health of survivors, rescuers and health personnel^.27 The tension is palpable, even within resilient communities, with volunteers reporting near exhaustion^.27

Similarly, intervention in Emilia-Romagna (post-flood 2023) proved the effectiveness of teams of emergency psychologists deployed for outreach activities^.16 The repetition of crises jeopardizes the

community resilience. The European response system must therefore formalize and fund ongoing psychological support for emergency personnel and committed citizens, as clean-up and recovery efforts are exhausting.

IV. Quantifying exposure: Economic balance and loss trends

The economic analysis of the 2024 disasters reveals a marked trend towards structurally higher costs, driven by the frequency of events, rising values at risk and the insurance deficit.

IV.A. Assessment of the economic cost of disasters in 2024

Total economic costs in Europe are on an upward trend. Flooding in Central Europe, for example, generated 4.2 billion euros in total damage^.6 In Germany, extreme weather events in 2024 resulted in 5.7 billion euros in insured losses, including 2.6 billion euros specifically due to flooding and heavy rain^.13 In France, the cost of weather events to insurers reached 5 billion euros in 2024^.28

Examination of the data confirms that Europe is paying the price of non-adaptation. The considerable increases in the cost of natural disasters since the 1980s ²⁸ and the projection of a 5-7% annual increase in insured damage ⁵ are direct economic indicators that mitigation and adaptation measures taken to date have been insufficient or too late, as also noted by the European Parliament^.20

IV.B. The Role and Limits of Insurance Companies in the face of Increasing Risks

One of the major vulnerabilities revealed in 2024 is the growing gap between total economic losses and insured losses. Worldwide, around 67% of losses due to natural disasters are uninsured^.4

This insurance deficit is blatantly obvious in the European figures: for the Central European floods, 2.3 billion euros of losses were uninsured (4.2 billion euros of total damage versus 1.9 billion euros of compensation)^.6 This residual cost is then transferred to national governments and European solidarity mechanisms.

This constant transfer of risk to the State poses a structural problem: the EUSF, conceived as a solidarity mechanism to cope with shocks, is increasingly called upon to subsidize reconstruction following frequent and foreseeable risks that should, in theory, be covered by the market. The recurrence and increase in “secondary risks” thus calls into question the viability of current risk-sharing arrangements. The debate on compulsory insurance for elementary damage, revived in Germany following the floods of the past ²³, is becoming imperative to secure public finances and guarantee fair coverage for citizens.

V. European Response and Solidarity: Effectiveness and Friction

The European Union’s response to the disasters of 2024 was based on two main pillars: the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) for financing, and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) for operational coordination.

V.A. Role and mobilization of the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)

The EUSF is the financial instrument designed to express the Union’s solidarity with regions affected by major natural disasters^.30

Table 3: Mobilization of the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) for disasters in 2024 (October 2024 proposal)

Member State	Disaster	Event date	Proposed amount (EUR)	Request status
Germany	Flooding (South)	May 2024	Share of €116,031,553 (Total DE/IT)	Proposal for a Council and Parliament Decision ⁸
Italy	Flooding (Aosta Valley)	June 2024	Share of €116,031,553 (Total DE/IT)	Proposal for a Council and Parliament Decision ⁸

The proposal to mobilize EUR 116,031,553 in October 2024 for Germany and Italy demonstrates the EU’s rapid response to these specific events in 2024^.8 The areas of intervention covered by the EUSF include the clean-up of disaster areas, rescue services, temporary accommodation and, significantly, the protection of cultural heritage, in addition to the restoration of essential infrastructure (energy, transport, health)^.8

However, the European Parliament has expressed concern about the size of this tool. Extreme weather events show that the level of damage far exceeds the Fund’s capacity. The Commission has been urged to increase the budget of the Solidarity Reserve and speed up its mobilization^.20 The amount that can be mobilized is deemed far too limited to cope with damage on a scale that is now structural^.20

V.B. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), coordinated by the ERCC, is the EU’s operational mechanism for responding to emergencies^.18 In 2024, the mechanism was activated 58 times to respond to various emergencies (floods, cyclones, landslides)^.18 The UCPM demonstrates effective operational solidarity through the deployment of experts and the exchange of information.

This commitment has been reinforced by the desire to broaden cooperation, notably with the consideration of Switzerland’s membership of the UCPM in 2024. The participation of Switzerland, with its wealth of emergency management experts, is seen as a significant added value in strengthening European response capabilities^.33

Despite the UCPM’s operational success in crisis situations, discussions at the Civil Protection Forum 2024 highlighted the importance of disaster risk reduction (DRR)^.34 Yet analysis reveals that natural hazard prevention remains a blind spot in European action, often overshadowed by the need for emergency response^.35

V.C. The EU’s climate adaptation deficit

The most critical assessment of the European response is provided by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Its Special Report 15/2024, published in October 2024, concludes that the EU’s climate change adaptation actions “fall short of ambitions”^.36

This assessment reveals fundamental weaknesses:

Difficulty of traceability: EU adaptation funds are difficult to trace, making it difficult to assess their effectiveness^.36
Short-term prioritization: Union-funded projects tend to prioritize short-term solutions over investment in long-term resilience^.36

The EU financial system is thus trapped in a logic of emergency reaction(ex post) rather than structural preventive investment. The mobilization of the EUSF, while necessary, is by nature reactive. The events of 2024, by their recurrence and increasing cost, confirm that this strategy is economically unsustainable. The European Parliament explicitly calls for adaptation to be given a more central place in all EU policies and funding ^mechanisms20, in line with the Commission’s March 2024 communication on climate risk management^.19

Finally, while the UCPM demonstrates strong technical solidarity, examples such as Mayotte (see Section III) reveal the limits of political solidarity in the face of structural precariousness and regional inequalities. The management of future disasters cannot be confined to repairs; it must aim to raise the adaptive capacity of all regions to an equitable level.

VI. Conclusion and strategic recommendations

2024 was a year of confirmation and intensification of climate risks in Europe. The impacts on populations are massive, disproportionately affecting public health (heat waves) and regional economic stability (floods and threats to agri-food). The economic and human data of 2024 call for a strategic reorientation of European policies, moving from a reactive posture to a proactive strategy of adaptation and financing.

VI.A. Summary of lessons learned in 2024

Changing Nature of Dominant Risk: Financial losses are now mainly due to the multiplication of “secondary risk” events (floods, hail), which induce a chronic erosion of assets that is more difficult to manage than isolated shocks.
Invisible Mortality Underestimated: Heat waves represent the leading cause of climate-related mortality in 2024, but they are insufficiently integrated and financed by European emergency mechanisms designed for physical destruction.
Structural Adaptation Deficit: The European Court of Auditors’ assessment confirms that most European funding remains geared towards short-term solutions, lacking a long-term vision for building systemic resilience.
Amplified social vulnerability: The impact of disasters is amplified in regions suffering from structural precariousness, underlining the need to integrate social cohesion into any climate adaptation strategy.

VI.B. Recommendations for strengthening European resilience

In order to effectively manage the growing impact of disasters, the following actions are considered essential for European institutions and Member States:

Reforming and increasing emergency and adaptation funding:
- Increase the budget of the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (Solidarité et d’Aide d’Urgence – FSUE) so that it is proportional to the increased severity and frequency of natural disasters in Europe^.31 The fund must be upgraded so that it is no longer perceived as too limited in the face of the scale of the damage^.20
- Put in place strict mechanisms to ensure that adaptation funding is traceable and directed towards sustainable solutions, not just quick fixes^.36
Harmonizing Risk Sharing Models :
- Encourage and potentially require member states to examine the introduction of compulsory insurance against basic risks (floods, hail) to avoid systematically transferring the cost of foreseeable risks to national and European public finances^.23
Systemic integration of health risk :
- Formally recognize heat wave management as a systemic disaster requiring proactive mobilization of resources (health, cooling infrastructure, urban planning) at the European level, given its massive human toll^.12
- Systematically integrate and fund emergency psychosocial support and mental health monitoring for victims, communities and responders within the framework of action of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, drawing on experience gained in Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina^.16
Priority to Vulnerability Prevention and Assessment :
- Accelerate the implementation of the European climate risk management strategy and ensure that adaptation and resilience become central and mandatory elements of all EU policies and investments, beyond mere emergency response^.19
- Emphasize the funding of accurate exposure and vulnerability diagnoses at community level to prepare minds for a better risk culture and guide investment in protective infrastructure^.35